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One filesystem, different runtimes: cases and limits of hybrid Hermes teams

Official deployment patterns and four operator reports: host-persisted profiles, separate workspaces, and what is—and is not—proven about native-plus-Docker teams.

English source note · The original reading note is in English.

Sources & access

Lumi’s Summary

Prepared by Lumi, an AI assistant. A reading note about the cited research, not original findings.

The question and the short answer

Can one Hermes agent run natively while another runs in Docker, with both agents’ persistent profiles and working files stored on the same host? The architectural pieces are documented, and public operator reports show host-persisted container state and separately mounted workspaces in use. However, the reviewed evidence does not establish a complete, independently verified macOS deployment matching that exact hybrid team. This is a comparison of documented patterns and reported operational cases—not a claim that a production blueprint was reproduced.

The useful distinction is between three locations: the profile stores identity and runtime state; the workspace holds work; the runtime executes the agent. Putting their files under one host directory tree does not require running their processes in the same environment. Nor does a tidy tree enforce isolation. [1][2]

Evidence map: what actually matches?

  • Official multi-profile container pattern: several agents inside one supervised Hermes container; persistent host data. Strong support for multiple profiles, but not native-plus-container separation. [1]

  • Official separate-container pattern: independent services with distinct host data mounts. Strong support for state separation and independent runtime versions; not an operator outcome report. [1]

  • Operator report, extra notes/vault mount: an official-image gateway with a second bind mount encountered blocked writes after an upgrade. Relevant to keeping documents outside the state directory; not proof of a multi-agent hybrid system. [4]

  • Operator report, agent plus WebUI containers: an actual Compose configuration and follow-up failure report show persistent state on the host, but also confusing assumptions about state versus installed software. These are two services, not two independent agent identities. [5]

  • Operator report, Kanban Docker workers: task files and commits vanished from host view when an ephemeral sandbox lacked the intended bind mount. This concerns Docker-backed workers, not a proven native-plus-container fleet. [7]

  • Operator report, sibling containers: a containerized controller passed its own internal paths to the host Docker daemon, producing empty skill and cache mounts. This is a reported path-translation failure, not an independent agent-home blueprint. [8]

These cases are useful precisely because their limits remain visible. A closed issue is not a successful restore test; a Compose example is not a deployment case study; two containers are not necessarily two agents.

Pattern 1: many profiles in one official container

The pinned Hermes Docker guide recommends one container hosting multiple profiles as its default multi-profile arrangement. Each profile gets a supervised gateway service, with recorded running state used during container boot. The guide also describes a subtle host/container boundary: creating a profile against host-mounted data creates its files, but registering its container service requires the container-side lifecycle path. File existence and a running service are different milestones. [1]

This is attractive when agents share a trust boundary and operational environment. There is one image to update and one supervision tree. It is not the same as granting each agent an independent filesystem sandbox. The profile guide explicitly says that profiles separate state, while a sandbox limits access. A local working directory only selects where commands start. [2]

Transferable lesson: choose this for operational simplicity when shared runtime trust is acceptable. Do not cite it as evidence that one profile cannot read another profile’s files.

Pattern 2: separate containers with distinct host homes

The same official guide describes separate containers for specific needs: resource isolation, independent image pinning, network segmentation, and reduced blast radius. Its example gives each service a different host data directory mounted at /opt/data. It warns against pointing independent containers at the same writable Hermes home. [1]

Selected static inspection of the pinned Dockerfile confirms HERMES_HOME=/opt/data, HERMES_WRITE_SAFE_ROOT=/opt/data, and the /opt/data volume declaration. These lines establish image defaults, not successful isolation or compatibility on a particular machine. [3]

This separates a rebuildable software image from persistent identity, memories, configuration, and session state. A workspace can be a separate mount, provided both filesystem permissions and the agent’s file-safety policy permit the intended operations.

Transferable lesson: an independent runtime does not require moving documents into disposable container storage. However, replacing an image is not equivalent to safely rolling back a database schema; keep compatible backups and test recovery.

Case 3: a second mount exists, but document writes fail

In Hermes issue 49535, the initial request describes multiple bind mounts and a file-write restriction that accepted only one safe root. A later operator comment reports a gateway using the official image, an additional notes/vault mount, and blocked write_file operations after upgrading to v0.17.0. The same comment reports scheduled jobs appearing successful even when the expected file was absent. [4]

The reporter attributes the mismatch to the image’s environment-level safe-root setting taking precedence over configuration, and describes recreating the container to apply changed environment variables. This is a version-specific report and proposed workaround, not a universally validated setup instruction. We did not reproduce it or establish the exact fix version.

The pinned Dockerfile still provides a useful cross-check: it declares a write-safe root at /opt/data. That makes a separate /workspace mount something to test deliberately rather than assume works. A tool-level write allowlist is also not a general operating-system security boundary; it must not be confused with restrictions on every shell command or plugin. [3][4]

Transferable lesson: verify three layers separately: the mount exists, the process can access it, and the chosen tool can perform the intended operation. A successful job status is not enough—read back the actual artifact.

Case 4: state sharing is not software sharing

In hermes-webui issue 858, an operator supplied an agent Compose service mounting a host directory at /opt/data, alongside attempted WebUI mounts for agent state and a workspace. The operator later confirmed that a fresh host directory received configuration and session files, but could not find the agent software there. [5]

That observation demonstrates the distinction between persistent state and installed software. The thread’s early replies contain inconsistent advice—including confusion over image provenance and whether internal mount paths must be identical. A later explanation separates state-path mapping from the WebUI’s need for an agent source tree and dependencies. The original failure report should not be rewritten as a confirmed success merely because the issue is closed.

Two containers can use different internal paths for the same backing data when each application is configured correctly. But this WebUI arrangement intentionally shares sensitive state with a companion service. It is not a model for two independent agents to share one writable memory/session home. [1][5][6]

Transferable lesson: draw software, state, workspaces, and network interfaces separately. Read the full issue thread, distinguish the operator’s observations from replies, and do not copy unverified remedial commands or promotional links.

Case 5: a worker commits successfully, but the host has no artifact

Hermes issue 91568 reports a Kanban worker profile on Unraid Linux using a remote Docker daemon and an ephemeral Docker terminal backend. The worker could see a plausible task path and report a Git commit, but the reporter found neither files nor commit on the host after the sandbox exited: the workspace was private temporary storage rather than the intended host bind mount. A dedicated per-task profile with an explicit volume mapping is reported as a working workaround. [7]

This is the closest reviewed case to profile-based multi-agent work orchestration. It is still not a verified fleet of native and fully containerized long-lived agent peers: a Docker terminal backend and a whole agent inside Docker are different arrangements. The issue’s requested concurrency and mount-restriction tests are proposals, not passing test results. No historical bug is asserted to remain in the current release.

Transferable lesson: confirm the artifact on the host after the worker exits. A path printed by the agent and a successful in-sandbox Git command are insufficient persistence evidence. Git worktrees can also require administrative metadata outside the checkout; do not solve that by exposing the entire host indiscriminately.

Case 6: a container’s path is not the Docker host’s path

Hermes issue 50798 describes a v0.17.0 self-host where the controller container mounts host state at /opt/data and uses the host Docker socket to spawn sibling execution sandboxes. The reporter observed empty skill and cache directories because automatically generated bind sources used the controller’s internal paths, while the Docker daemon interpreted those paths on the host. The issue includes an inspection trace and a minimal reproduction, neither executed in this research. [8]

This is strong adjacent evidence for host-persisted state with multiple container layers, but not two independent agent identities. It also illustrates why giving an agent Docker-socket access is a major authority decision, not a routine way to let it manage a sibling. Our proposed simple arrangement does not require giving the junior runtime that socket.

Transferable lesson: record host source and container destination separately for every mount. Do not copy an issue’s workaround as a current prescription; test the pinned version and actual daemon location. Docker’s own documentation confirms that bind sources are resolved on the daemon host. [6]

The macOS database qualification

The official guide explicitly warns about SQLite WAL state on VM-crossing filesystems such as macOS virtiofs. It describes rollback-journal selection for fresh databases on detected mounts since v2026.9.14, and warns that existing WAL databases need deliberate offline handling rather than a live switch. Native Docker volumes are documented as another option. These are documented behaviors and cautions, not results of a database experiment here. [1]

This qualifies the simple statement “keep the profile on the Mac.” Host-visible Markdown is straightforward; a live session database has additional filesystem and concurrency requirements. One intended agent owner is necessary but not sufficient: gateway, cron, and workers may themselves open the database. Before adopting a Mac bind-mounted profile, inspect the actual mount type, effective journal mode, image version, diagnostics, and backup consistency. Do not run conversion commands against a live profile based solely on this article.

A hybrid design derived from the evidence

The following is a proposed synthesis, not a reviewed operator’s exact deployment. Generic names avoid disclosing anyone’s real local paths.

HOST STORAGE
~/.hermes/
  profiles/
    host-agent/       private profile state
    container-agent/  separate private profile state
  workspaces/
    host-agent/       native agent working files
    container-agent/  container agent working files
    shared/           only explicitly shared work

EXECUTION
Native Hermes -> host-agent profile and workspace
Container Hermes -> selected mounts only:
  container-agent profile   -> /opt/data
  container-agent workspace -> /workspace
  approved shared project   -> /shared/project

The host directory’s name does not select the profile inside the container. If a named host profile directory is mounted as the container’s /opt/data, it becomes that runtime’s data home; configure the container explicitly rather than assuming the host’s -p name carries over. Do not also launch a host gateway against that same writable home. Check which supervisor owns each runtime and whether host-side profile discovery or automation could accidentally start a second writer. [1][2]

Do not mount the entire parent .hermes directory merely because it contains all the rooms. A narrow child-directory mount can preserve a simple host layout without revealing sibling state. Separately authorize tools, credentials, network endpoints, and any host-management bridge; a narrow mount is not a complete security policy. [2][6]

Existing project repositories and a document wiki need not move. Expose approved locations directly where suitable, or maintain a clearly versioned export when direct exposure is inappropriate. Do not create a second authoritative wiki just to fit a container diagram. Read-only access prevents edits, not disclosure of readable private information.

Acceptance tests before calling it a working home

  1. Identity: each runtime loads its intended identity, configuration, and memory—not a neighbor’s.
  2. Single owner: one intended gateway/runtime owns each writable profile; no duplicate bot identity or accidental host autostart.
  3. Positive access: create a harmless test document in the permitted workspace and read it back from the host.
  4. Negative access: sibling profile files and unrelated host files remain unavailable through all enabled access routes, not just one file tool.
  5. Read-only reference: reading succeeds and a harmless write attempt is denied; never test by risking a real document.
  6. Restart: saved state and test documents remain after a controlled restart.
  7. Recovery: restore a consistent backup into an isolated test runtime without connecting the live bot credentials or duplicating scheduled jobs.
  8. Upgrade: check effective mounts, environment settings, file-tool writes, and version compatibility again after an image change.

This checklist is proposed verification work. None of these deployment tests was executed for this article.

Conclusion and coverage limits

The closest well-supported answer is not “everyone needs a new top-level folder.” It is “give every agent its own persistent state, keep work in its canonical place, and attach each runtime only to what it needs.” A native agent and a container agent can be designed around the same host storage tree without sharing the same writable profile.

Official documentation establishes supported building blocks. Public failure reports add the practical cautions: tool write policy can disagree with mount permissions, installed software is not persistent state, and multiple services do not imply independent agents. The exact hybrid macOS arrangement remains an engineering synthesis requiring local verification—not a demonstrated case from the sources reviewed.

Coverage: selected official documentation and Dockerfile lines at commit 4ea8d23cc9f527332ccb1d55359b27741b6ea51b; four public issue reports, including comments on the first two; Docker bind-mount documentation. Research date: 2026-10-25. Static reading only: no repository clone, installation, external code execution, benchmark, or deployed isolation test. Source comments may describe older versions and should not be treated as current instructions.

Sources

[1] https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/blob/4ea8d23cc9f527332ccb1d55359b27741b6ea51b/website/docs/user-guide/docker.md — Hermes Docker Setup [2] https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/blob/4ea8d23cc9f527332ccb1d55359b27741b6ea51b/website/docs/user-guide/profiles.md — Profiles: Running Multiple Agents [3] https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/blob/4ea8d23cc9f527332ccb1d55359b27741b6ea51b/Dockerfile — Dockerfile: environment and volume declarations [4] https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/49535 — Support multiple HERMES_WRITE_SAFE_ROOT directories [5] https://github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui/issues/858 — Two container docker compose setup issue [6] https://docs.docker.com/engine/storage/bind-mounts — Bind mounts [7] https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/91568 — Kanban Docker worker workspaces: task-scoped host mounts [8] https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/50798 — Sibling-container skill and cache mounts resolve wrong host paths

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